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Title:  Between Performance and Participation:  The Time of Action in Hanna Arendt 
 
This thesis takes up the debate between the agonal and deliberative interpretations 
of Hannah Arendt’s conception of political action.  In it, I redeem the model of action as 
performance found in her descriptions of agonal politics and pull emphasis away from the 
deliberative model of communicative action on the basis of Arendt’s ontology of 
temporality and her account of the witnessing and judging spectatorship that preserves 
the meaningfulness of human events against oblivion.  I find the danger of this loss of 
meaning accounted for by the agonal model in the syncopated relationship between 
spectator and actor.  The deliberative model of communicative action, however, collapses 
the roles of actor and spectator into the uniform role of participant and replaces 
experiential grounds of legitimacy with atemporal rational grounds.  Communicative 
action is unable to account for the public realm as a space of endurance and skirts the 
ontological stakes of Arendt’s agonal politics. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a notable and deceptive distinction between the way that Hannah Arendt 
thematizes action in the Human Condition, on the one hand, and On Revolution and 
Crises of the Republic, on the other.  The distinction – attributable to the difference 
between the ancient and modern historical anchors employed in each text – has invited 
those who critically dismiss Arendt’s account of action in the Greek polis to reclaim 
Arendt as a relevant political thinker in light of the value of her later work to a 
conception of deliberative democratic politics.  The interpretations of Jürgen Habermas, 
Seyla Benhabib, and Maurizio d’Entrèves similarly rehearse the move of redeeming later 
Arendt by fitting her concepts of power, acting in concert, and her reading of Kant’s 
sensus communis into a model of deliberative politics.  By trading the model of an agonal 
politics of performance, found in the Human Condition, for a deliberative politics of 
participation, these theorists lay claim to an egalitarian and tenably modern reading of 
Arendt.  The upshot of such a move, however, is the loss of action as performance, or 
rather, a reduction of action as speech and deed (or speech-as-deed) to argumentative 
discourse, and the correlate collapse of the relationship between actor and spectator that 
is constitutive of the public realm as a space of revelatory appearance.  The model of 
public action as participation in a discourse brackets the theatrical element to its 
detriment, and it is my contention that this move fails to grasp the ontological category of 
natality and the temporal role it plays at the basis of Arendt’s political thought.  It is my 
further worry that it preserves, rather than mitigates, the modern disharmony between the 
vita activa and the vita contemplativa, the “active life” and the “life of the mind.” 
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Arendt’s ontology situates the human condition between the finitude of earthly 
existence and the infinite capacities for forgetting and beginning anew.  The “fact” of 
natality – that is, the fact that the world is constantly disrupted by the coming into being 
of new and uninitiated human beings – is the common ground of both freedom and 
oblivion in Arendt’s work.  As freedom, natality is actualized in respect to two functions 
of action:  the initiation of something new and unpredictable, and the disclosure of “who” 
one is.  The opportunity for agency and self-disclosure thus often become the broad 
criteria of action in democratic theory drawn from Arendt.  Habermas, Benhabib, and 
D'Entrèves, for example, each make the case for a politics of deliberative participation on 
the basis of these criteria.  At the same time, however, natality’s promise of new 
possibilities continually threatens the public realm with its own loss.  For continuity and 
endurance, the common world of the public hinges on the particular – on the life of the 
mind of each individual member of a plurality to recollect, understand, and save what has 
come to pass from the wreckage of time.  For it to endure, the public realm of action must 
prepare individuals to thing from within the temporal-historical gap they occupy during 
the course of their lifetime.  Insofar as the deliberative model of discursive public space 
entails a realm of agency and recognition, it actualizes natality as a promise of freedom.  
It does not, however, account for the aspect of public life that safeguards against oblivion 
by preparing the individual for the task of thinking “in” time.  That is, it lacks 
spectatorship. 
My goal in the following paper is to develop from Arendt’s concepts of natality, 
action, and thought an understanding of the public realm as the meeting place of the 
active life and the life of the mind.  By responding directly to the deliberative readings of 
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Arendt, I hope to bring to light the importance of spectatorship to her characterization of 
action as performance, and highlight the particular dangers of communicative action’s 
atemporal and rationalistic criteria for political praxis.  The double bind of natality places 
a clear burden on the political actor and spectating judge to adhere to historical (i.e. 
experiential), and not rational, grounds of legitimacy.  Arendt suggests that this burden 
has only become weightier since the modern age has propelled humankind into a world 
marked by unprecedented change and increasing momentum, on the one hand, and the 
failure of thought to grasp the meaning of new events, on the other.  The possibility that 
we may be “forever be unable to understand, that is, to think and speak about the things 
which nevertheless we are able to do” is the informing dread behind Arendt’s seminal 
exhumation, so to speak, of the vita activa.
1
  The hope for a space of continuity as such 
lies in a balanced relationship between the previously opposed worlds of thought and 
action.   
I begin with the agonal/deliberative divide and briefly emphasize aspects of this 
debate in Arendt literature, largely from the standpoint of D’Entrèves assessment in the 
Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt.  His account is particularly fruitful because he 
operates from the position that the agonal and the deliberative models are irreducibly 
separate politics, grounded in two irreducibly separate conceptualizations of action:  
“expressive” and “communicative” action.  He, Benhabib, and Habermas each adopt a 
deliberative politics, comprised of communicative action, in response to severe 
contentions with Arendt’s appeal to antiquity in her account of expressive action.  They 
defend a deliberative politics of participation as model of political legitimacy on the basis 
of unhindered, egalitarian, and reciprocal communication.  A politics of performance, 
                                                          
1
 Hannah Arendt. The Human Condition. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 3. 
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supported, for example, by Dana Villa and Paul Kottman, accounts for the legitimacy of 
public speech precisely because it is performative and not deliberational.  They appeal to 
Arendt’s ontology of appearance, which grasps action as a confirmation and a becoming.  
Action instantiates its own self-legitimizing structure of reference, by virtue of its 
appearance in the light of the public. 
In the second section, I return to Arendt’s recovery of the vita activa from its 
traditional subordination to philosophical contemplation in the Human Condition.  I 
briefly discuss the role of the public realm and its relation to a worldly conceptualization 
of reality.  From the perspective of the active life, being is appearing.  It is not the 
contemplating eye of the mind, as with Plato’s philosopher, but the physical eyes and ears 
of the witnessing public that lends the “feeling” of reality to the event.  Arendt’s recovery 
of the active life closes by hinting at a similar retrieval of an originary constellation of the 
life of the mind, unbound to its traditional characterization as eternal thought, and its 
modern formulation as the scientific method.  The vita contemplativa proper can be 
understood in relation to vita activa proper as the form of judgment embodied in the 
figures of the spectator of the theatrum mundi.  The public space of the theatrum mundi, 
however, constrains the thinking space of judgment.  Where natality refers to the fact that 
the world must reckon with a “constant influx of newcomers who are born into the world 
as strangers” then in order for a public realm to sustain itself non-coercively, it must 
cultivate the faculty of judgment of each newcomer in such a way that allows each 
individual to bridge for themselves the space between past and future.
2
  In this task, the 
difference between the disclosure of rationally determined facts and arguments, found in 
                                                          
2
 Arendt, the Human Condition, 9. 
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the deliberational model, and the narrative disclosure of events and stories, found in the 
agonal model, is crucial.   
Thus, I close by arguing that the capacity for the agonal and deliberative models 
to enact a narrative disclosure should be final criterion of each model’s fidelity to 
Arendt’s ontology.  In the third section, I return to the agonal/deliberative debate and 
locate Arendt on the side of an agonal politics of performance.  By collapsing the roles of 
actor and spectator into a uniformly shared role of participator or deliberator, the 
discursive public sphere of the deliberative model loses the theatrum mundi – and with it 
the disclosure of narrative – and reduces action to its beginning capacity, without offering 
an account of public memory.  By maintaining the public sphere as a dramatic setting, 
dually constituted by the roles of actor and spectator, an agonal politics of performance 
opens the gap between past and future for a plurality and establishes a space of 
remembering and beginning.  Without world-building disclosure, which grounds 
common sense in the theatrum mundi, rational deliberation risks rendering individuals 
impotent to find meaning in and reconcile themselves with the world around them.  The 
deliberative model, in collapsing the roles of actor and spectator, hypostatizes narrative as 
rationally determined fact, and the loss of historical ground entailed therein renders the 
deliberative politics of participation indeed all-too-progressive. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE AGONAL/DELIBERATIVE DIVIDE 
Maurizio d’Entrèves, in the Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt, attempts to 
draw from Arendt a model of active citizenship in which each citizen attains a measure of 
agency and political efficacy.  His goal is to redeem Arendt from her critics and to 
highlight “her contribution to a theory of participatory democracy based on the principles 
of freedom, plurality, equality, and stability.”3  To do so, he joins Arendt in the task of 
renewing a public sphere of political action, however with the caveat that political action 
in the modern era takes a different form from the model of ancient Greek praxis that 
Arendt espouses in the Human Condition.  Those who infamously criticize Arendt for her 
turn to the Greek polis as the model of an originary political experience, d’Entrèves 
contends, fail to recognize the merits of Arendt’s later conceptualizations of action, 
judgment, citizenship, and the public realm.  The difference between the two “distinct 
and opposed” sets of concepts found in Arendt’s earlier and later works proves crucial to 
d’Entrèves’ argument.4  He first distinguishes between two forms of action – 
“expressive” action and “communicative” action – and develops from each a model of 
public space and the role of citizen. 
The expressive model of action names Arendt’s account of action in the Greek 
polis.  In the expressive model, d’Entrèves explains, “politics is viewed as an agonal 
encounter between actors who strive for recognition and glory.”5  The expressive actor is 
Arendt’s doer of great deeds and speaker of great words.  The expressive model grounds 
                                                          
3
 D’Entrèves, the Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt, (London: Routledge, 1994), ix. 
 
4
 Ibid., 145. 
 
5
 Ibid., 19. 
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a conception of public space as a dramatic setting for the performance of word and deed 
and a conception of citizenship as competitive heroism, motivated by the desire for glory 
and immortal fame.  Though d’Entrèves understands the polis to be a metaphor for a 
particular type of political experience, and I agree, it is worth recalling the external 
structures involved in Arendt’s historical example of this type of action.  The Greek polis 
sustained a public realm of pure praxis that excluded the activity of poesis (Arendt’s 
notion of work), and the instrumental logic that follows from means-end activity of 
fabrication.  In other words, the public of the polis was filtered of all economic concerns, 
all forms of craftsmanship (even the crafting of the laws), as well as any sort of 
instrumental or coercive restrictions on what form of action could take place.  Those who 
entered the public realm had to be free from the burdens of the private realm, i.e. bodily 
labor, and thus women and slaves were excluded from participation.  
Where the hero of the expressive model engages in a personal struggle for 
recognition, the communicative model of action consists in a public realm of mutuality 
and solidarity.  D’Entrèves turns to the account of modern political action that Arendt 
offers in On Revolution and Crises of the Republic for a model of politics that guarantees 
the same freedom of the Greek polis without the loss of the practical or the rule of 
competitive struggle for recognition.  The modern examples cited by Arendt in these later 
works depict action as a form of resistance and contestation, as the “acting in concert” of 
a plurality that brings power and legitimacy to their collective standpoint.  From the 
expressive to the communicative model, the competitive struggle for recognition of one’s 
identity is traded for a “mode of human togetherness” in which each participant is 
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automatically recognized as a fellow citizen.
6
  Where the expressive model excludes the 
practical logic of lawmaking from the realm of political activities, the communicative 
model promises a practical element – goal setting and strategic action – on the basis of 
mutually derived legitimacy. 
Other critics of Arendt’s use of the Greek model are George Kateb and Jürgen 
Habermas.  On the tension between Arendt’s earlier and later works, Kateb remarks that 
“politics as the will to heroic greatness, to glory, politics as agon, remains with her as 
when she speaks of modern revolutions, but she makes room for the more modest, almost 
nameless politics of the councils or civil disobedience.”7  He thus adopts a rigid 
conception of Arendt’s political theory, assuming it to be analogous to the model of the 
Greek polis, with some concession to institutions of direct democracy in her later 
writings.  He paints Arendt as an elitist by mistaking the Greek separation of the political 
realm of freedom and the private realm of bodily toil for a disdain for the latter on 
Arendt’s behalf.8  He also infamously condemns the purity of the public realm of the 
Greek model, in its exclusion of instrumentality and economic concerns, for resulting in a 
model of politics in which the only content of political deliberation can be politics itself.
9
  
The crux of his criticism, however, is the charge of political amoralism.  As a realm of 
opinion and perspective, the pure public realm has no way of acknowledging absolute 
                                                          
6
 Ibid., 132. 
 
7
 George Kateb. Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil. (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Allanheld, 
1984), 7. 
 
8
 Ibid., 2.  Re:  “The deficiency of Most of Life’s Activities”  Certainly Arendt’s conception of political 
freedom would preclude a moral condemnation of those whose lives revolve around private “existentially 
inadequate” (6) activities, especially in modern “dark” times, in which access to a realm of political 
freedom is limited to but a handful of people. 
 
9
 Ibid., 21. 
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moral standards.  He recalls that, according to Arendt, feelings of pity, love, and 
compassion belong to the private realm and would then be incapable of grounding 
behavior in the public realm.
10
  Kateb finds occasion for worry and trepidation in the 
absence of a strong normativity in Arendt’s theory. 
While Kateb condemns the Greek model for a lack of normative grounds, 
Habermas take issue with its rigidity.  Also interpreting Arendt on the basis of her 
account of the Greek model alone, Habermas speculates that the definitive separation of 
praxis and poesis is an antiquated thought.  He valorizes her conception of political 
power, which he defines as “the ability to agree upon a common course of action in 
unconstrained communication.”11  For Habermas, Arendt’s contribution of this category 
to a theory of political legitimacy is enormous.  At the same time, he charges Arendt’s 
adherence to the ancient separation of action and production with three pitfalls:  “(a) she 
screens all strategic elements, as force, out of politics; (b) she removes politics from its 
relations to the economic and social environment in which it is embedded through the 
administrative system; and (c) she is unable to grasp structural violence.”12  By remaining 
bound to a classic model, Arendt’s own political theory is drastically limited.  Her 
equation of strategic and instrumental power leaves her with an untenable model of the 
public realm.  Habermas corrects this limitation by introducing a strategic element to 
praxis and power.  Though power – i.e. legitimacy – can only be generated by the 
                                                          
10
 Ibid., 25. 
 
11
 “Hannah Arendt’s Communications Concept of Power” in Hannah Arendt: Critical Essays, edited by 
Hinchman and Hinchman, 211-230. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 213. 
 
12
 Ibid., 216. 
 10 
 
concerted action of a plurality, strategically enforced institutions and practices are 
necessary in order to acquire, maintain, and employ positions of power.
13
 
Habermas makes one further stipulation in his interpretation of Arendt.  When she 
refers to power as the ground of legitimacy of concerted action, she does so on the basis 
of common sense, the fact that all involved share in a common reality and share a 
common conviction.  Arendt’s conception of the sensus communis springs from her 
appreciation of Kant’s theory of reflective judgment, which does not assume laws of 
reason, but names the task of finding the rule that fits contingent particulars.  Arendt’s 
theory, Habermas claims, further suffers from an “antiquated concept of theoretical 
knowledge” that “keeps Arendt from comprehending the process of reaching agreement 
about practical questions as rational discourse.”14  Linda Zerilli summarizes Habermas’s 
contention fairly.  She asserts that he “more or less accuses Arendt of aestheticizing 
politics, that is, of identifying this [public] realm with opinions that cannot be subjected 
to rational process of validation any more than we can validate judgments of taste.”15  
Arendt’s understanding of theoretical knowledge removes the possibility of self-evidence 
and restricts public discourse to the realm of opinion; rendering concerted action as the 
instantiation of mere shared opinion.  Habermas contends, however, that common 
convictions can be founded cognitively, through rationalized deliberative process, and 
that a commonly shared opinion can traverse into the realm of recognized facts upon 
                                                          
13
 Ibid., 217. 
 
14
 Ibid., 222. 
 
15
 Linda Zerilli.  “We Feel Our Freedom: Imagination and Judgment in the Thought of Hannah Arendt.”  
Political Theory 33.2 (2005), 159. 
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rational deliberation and agreement.
16
  Thus, the category of Arendt that is most valorized 
by Habermas, power, takes a drastically different form in his own theory of 
communicative action.  Power becomes the capacity to agree on the basis of rational 
deliberation.  It is a source of legitimacy, not because of the sheer number of people who 
are in common agreement, as Arendt claims, but because of the rational basis for the 
claims at hand. 
According to d’Entrèves, neither Kateb nor Habermas would have held the same 
criticisms of Arendt had they bifurcated her conceptualization of action.  He defends 
Arendt’s moral considerations against Kateb by, first, acknowledging that Kateb’s 
presupposition of absolute normative standards is incompatible with Arendt’s 
existentialism and, second, by suggesting that a deliberative conception of the public 
realm, as a discursive space of communicative action, promises the possibility of a public 
coming to rational agreement about a set of universally upheld norms.  His defense of 
Arendt against Habermas, on the other hand, is implied in his own appropriation of 
Habermas’s reading of Arendt.  Where Habermas finds Arendt to be stuck in antiquity, 
d’Entrèves reads her modern accounts as an altogether different model of action, which 
Habermas himself recognizes but does not attribute to Arendt originally.  Thus, the 
communicative model of action, for d’Entrèves, captures Arendt’s account of deliberative 
and participatory politics.  While the expressive model depicts a domain of “noble 
deeds,” the communicative model suggests a realm of speech alone.  Drawing on 
Habermas’s interpretation of Arendt, d’Entrèves envisions a “collective process of 
                                                          
16
 Habermas, “Hannah Arendt’s Communications Concept of Power”, 323. 
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deliberation and decision-making that rests on equality and solidarity.”17  In the 
communicative model, a plurality of participants engage in limitless discourse to the end 
of attaining mutual recognition and consensus about needs and goals.   
For d’Entrèves, the expressive and communicative models are irreducible to the 
point of allowing interpretive negotiation between agonal and deliberative political 
models, between a politics of performance and a politics of participation.  Since his 
specific interpretive investment lies in forming a conception of “Arendtian citizenship” or 
civic engagement that promotes the capacity for agency and identity-formation, 
d’Entrèves adopts the communicative model and rejects the expressive.  He champions 
the model of collective action and the discursive politics of participation on the basis of 
the fitness of discourse to answer the question collective identity and cultivate effective 
political involvement from all citizens.  He suggests that “a collective identity under 
modern conditions can arise out of a process of public argumentation and debate in which 
competing ideals of identity and political legitimacy are articulated, contested, and 
refined.”18 
In the Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, Seyla Benhabib performs an 
interpretive gesture similar to d’Entrèves’s division of expressive and communicative 
action.  Benhabib also endeavors to emphasize Arendt’s contribution to political theory.  
She does so by separating out Arendt’s philosophical contribution.  Her stated goal is to 
“decenter the place of the Human Condition” in Arendt’s corpus.19  She recognizes the 
                                                          
17
D’Entrèves, the Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt, 85. 
 
18
 Ibid., 136. 
 
19
 Seyla Benhabib. The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt. (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 
xxxix 
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text as an important philosophical text in which Arendt finds herself in dialogue with 
Marx and Heidegger.  In it, Benhabib finds a strong account of equality as the equality-
in-difference that constitutes plural togetherness.  She suggests, however, that Arendt 
does not offer a normative, but an anthropological account, which leaves her analysis of 
the human condition in politically ambivalent territory.  Arendt takes up a quaesto facti 
and not a quaestro juris and fails to “examine the philosophical step that would lead from 
a description of the equality of the human condition to the equality that comes from 
moral and political recognition.”20  It does not, however, provide a prescriptive model of 
an ideal politics.  Public space thus takes the form of a socio-political correlate of the 
more fundamental and phenomenological human condition of becoming actual within a 
space of appearance.
21
   
Benhabib acknowledges her debt to Habermas when she draws from Arendt’s 
conception of common sense (the sensus communis) a correlate “procedure for 
ascertaining intersubjective agreement in the public realm.”22  With Habermas and Kateb, 
Benhabib is critical of the Greek model for requiring an untenable separation of the 
public, economic, and private realms, as well as the normative lacuna present in the form 
itself.
23
  With d’Entrèves, she turns to Habermas for a solution based in communicative 
action.  She distinguishes between expressive and communicative action, however, by 
rejecting the expressive as an essentialist form of action, and supporting the “narrative” 
                                                          
20
 Ibid., 196. 
 
21
 Ibid., xliv. 
 
22
 Ibid., 189. 
 
23
 Ibid., 193-8. 
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structure of communicative action that does not reveal, but constructs identities and 
relationships.   
In the Human Condition and throughout her works, Arendt laments the loss of a 
public space for action.  D’Entrèves, Habermas, and Benhabib interpret the loss as the 
loss of sites of participation and recognition, recoverable in a discursively constituted 
public realm, in which all present are participants in political process.  All three rely on 
the juxtaposition of a form of communicative action, as agreement-oriented collective 
and unconstrained deliberation, to expressive action, as the agonal struggle for self-
distinction.  They employ concepts of identity, agency, efficacy, and legitimacy as 
measures of the worthwhile political model.  To their staunch and high appraisal of the 
communicative model, Dana Villa offers a dissonant appreciation of the agonal model on 
the basis of the worldliness experienced by the political actor in each model.  At stake in 
Arendt’s concept of action is not a measure of efficacy or equal participation, but a way 
of being in the world.   
Villa voices a direct response to d’Entrèves and Benhabib in his discussion of 
“Theatricality and the Public Realm” in his Politics, Philosophy, Terror.  He concedes 
the difference between action as the performance of word and deed and action as 
deliberation and “acting in concert”; however, he urges the two theorists to not dismiss 
the relevance of the agonal model.  He contends that Arendt’s conception of action and 
public space in the Human Condition places an emphasis on a theatrical dimension of 
performance that has “much to teach us about the nature of a healthy public sphere and 
 15 
 
the reasons for its contemporary decline.”24  For Villa, the model of the Greek polis 
forms an “instructive lesson” about the modern worldlessness.25   
Contra d’Entrèves, Villa argues for an understanding of performance in the public 
realm as a theatrical appearing, as the assumption of the mask of a public persona.  Such 
appearing certainly remains a disclosure of who one “inexchangeably” is, though it does 
not “express” the actor’s personal private identity.26  The assumption of a public identity 
is the specific achievement of performing word and deed in the polis.  This is largely due 
to the primacy of appearance that foregrounds the perspectivality of the public realm.  
The different eyes and ears of those spectating give action a feeling of reality, in two 
respects.  The event of the performance itself is a common object, to be grasped from 
every possible standpoint.  Further, because the actor cannot know what he is doing in the 
spontaneous moment of action, the event becomes an object of reflection and judgment 
after it has come to completion.  As one emerging into the space of appearances, the 
actor’s disclosure of his identity is simultaneously its constitution.  The performance 
model of action, grasped by Villa as constitutive of identity and not expressive, becomes 
remarkably similar to Benhabib’s conception of narrative action.  For Benhabib, 
however, narrative action is institutionally, and not phenomenologically, constructive of 
identities and relationships. 
Villa locates Arendt’s strongest depersonalization of action in her appreciation of 
Montesquieu’s notion of principled action.  Arendt asserts that action in public is always 
inspired by a principle exhibited within the action itself.  The actor who begins from a 
                                                          
24
 Dana Villa. Politics, Philosophy, Terror.  (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1999), 130. 
 
25
 Ibid. 
 
26
 Arendt, the Human Condition, 41. 
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commonly shared principle leaves unexpressed those mundane aspects of identity that are 
related to private prepolitical experiences.  Individuality and differentiation are achieved 
in the public realm through the appearance of rare and extraordinary acts.  The public 
mask is simultaneously a disclosure of a unique identity, and a vehicle for confirming a 
common value or judgment on the part of the public spectatorship. In the Greek polis, the 
struggle for recognition and glory is bound up with the desire to achieve greatness and 
appear as its exemplar.  The theatrical elements of performance and spectatorship 
constitute the phenomenal worldliness of the public as a sphere of reality and endurance.  
This theatricality, Villa argues, constitutes the public realm as a theatrum mundi, a world-
stage, enabled by convention and custom.   
D’Entrèves, Benhabib, and Habermas claim to join Arendt in the task of 
recovering praxis; however their discursive model offers a much narrower range of 
experiences than the originary public realm they claim to recover.
27
  The notion of a 
theatrum mundi is lost on a model of sheer deliberation.  Between a politics of 
participation and a politics of performance, only the latter captures the phenomenal and 
fundamental correlation of reality and appearance, of acting as a form of disclosure.  
Communicative deliberation performs the same function as agonal performance – that is, 
it discloses and confirms a shared reality – however, without the basis of appearance.  
Where the agonal model appeals to the irreducible standpoints of a plural spectatorship, 
and equates disclosure with public differentiation, communicative action appeals to 
moments of agreement and mutual recognition of validity claims.  Action as performance 
arises by virtue of the theatrical spatiality of the public realm as a space of appearance.  
Action as communication adheres in a speech-pattern of contestation and agreement. 
                                                          
27
 Ibid., 152. 
 17 
 
 
All of the above interpretations have in common the imperative to recover a lost 
experience of political action and a dwindled form of public freedom.  At the heart of the 
loss of action, for Arendt, is the loss of the primacy of appearance at the beginning of the 
western philosophical tradition.  The traditional subordination of ‘doing’ to ‘thinking’ is 
reversed, however, by the modern scientific and mechanistic worldviews, which locate 
knowledge, not in the quiet contemplation of the mind, but in the measurable effects of 
fabricated natural processes.  In the following section, I revisit Arendt’s account of the 
traditional hierarchy of doing and thinking in terms of both turns in order to envision the 
consequences of each for a project of recovery.  I challenge the way in which the 
communicative model of action equates the initiatory capacity of action with Arendt’s 
conception of the freedom to begin.  I argue that Arendt conceives of action’s beginning 
capacity in coinciding two senses.  As initiation, action has an unpredictable process-
starting potential.  By acting into nature or into a public, one originates a new chain of 
occurrences.  The “event” of inventive fabrication that introduces new technologies into 
the world shares in this same process-beginning potential.  As performative disclosure, 
however, action begins in the sense of introducing or contributing something new and 
self-evident into the world.  This usually occurs in the form of a story, which can become 
an object inspiring or a testament informing future action.  In the performance model, 
action as beginning can be analogous to a continuation or amendment of a foundational 
event.  The difference between these two conceptions of action becomes crucial when 
considering the memorial function of the public realm and temporal correlation between 
thinking and doing.  
 18 
 
CHAPTER III 
NATALITY AND THE TEMPORALITY OF ACTION 
The entirety of Arendt’s political thought can be grasped as an effort to recover 
originary and lost forms of political practice.  Benhabib attributes to Arendt a “reluctant” 
modernism in light of her methodological privileging of origins.  She does not accuse 
Arendt of nostalgia, however.  Arendt engages a practice of storytelling that entails a 
redemptive recovery of the past, as well as a theoretical move.  She traces originary 
political structures by narrating their displacement or loss.  This recovery is more 
performative than prescriptive.  Her work is an exercise in memory, Benhabib claims, “in 
the sense of a creative act of rethinking which sets free the lost potentials of the past.”28  
However, she recovers more than lost potentials.  Arendt’s project is not bent toward 
reviving a concept of praxis in a modern context.  Her storytelling is, at its base, a critical 
and ontological endeavor.  The thread of tradition that she traces back to political 
theory’s Platonic heritage is the grounding condition of contemporary political theory and 
practice.  By tracing the traditional displacement of action, she is able to grasp praxis in 
its foundational and inaugural appearance.  The origins she uncovers are ontologically 
foundational in a primordial sense.  It is not temporal distance that separates ancient 
Greek practice from modern politics, but rather its ontological horizon.  Arendt 
reconceptualizes the public space of the polis around the most elemental aspects of the 
human condition:  plurality and natality.  
By recollecting the story of Homeric Greece and Periclean Athens, Arendt is thus 
able to craft a corrective to the traditional opposition of acting and contemplating – to the 
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fact that the task of understanding worldly activities has been taken up almost exclusively 
by professional thinkers, with little taste for the life spent in the mundane and imperfect 
materiality of the bios politikos.  Arendt’s narrative of ancient Greek life uncovers and 
preserves an originary conception of the active life, the vita activa proper, without 
subordination to or dominance over the realm of thought.  Arendt seeks to restore to 
“those activities concerning the common public realm that comes into being whenever 
men live together” a “dignity of their own.”29   
The simple fact of “living together” is the ground of the political as such.  The 
human condition of plurality finds expression in Arendt’s assertion that “men, not Man, 
live on the earth and inhabit the world” and gives way to a notion of equality premised on 
the fact that “nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live.”30  
Plurality is the condition of the equality-in-difference that arises in a public realm.  
Human being in the plural is grounded in the fundamental condition of natality, by the 
“constant influx of newcomers who are born into the world as strangers.”31  Plurality is 
thus not merely a condition of difference, but of constitutive fluidity.  The “fact” of 
natality promises an unending pathos of novelty and distinctness in all human activities.  
As ontological claims, natality and plurality are both grounding conditions and potential 
capacities of human being.  They fundamentally constitute the human condition, but only 
become “actualized” in the political dimension of the vita activa. 
Arendt’s vita activa refers to a phenomenologically derived typology of worldly 
activities:  work, action, and labor.  Quite literally, these activities comprise “what we are 
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doing” – Arendt’s proposed subject in the Human Condition.32  Each adheres in the world 
of other people, while the vita contemplativa – as thinking, willing, and judging – 
describes those activities that take place in the individual mind and thus necessitate some 
level of withdrawal from the world of others.  Action holds the privileged place in 
Arendt’s political thought because, unlike work and labor, action adheres, unmediated, 
between people.  As speech and deed, action leaves no objective trace, though it alone 
has a process-beginning potential.  To act and to begin are analogous concepts in 
Arendt’s thought.  Work, as poesis, refers to the fabrication process of homo faber.  Work 
concludes in the production of a durable worldly artifact and, as such, is the condition of 
the objectivity of the world.  Labor refers to man’s metabolism with the earth.  It is the 
cyclical motion needed for the sustenance of life and, unlike work, leaves behind no 
worldly artifacts.   
Arendt refers to the human “condition” in an effort to distinguish her originary 
form of political thought from traditional theory, which prescribes political models on the 
basis of hypostatized conceptions of human nature.  Rather than conjecturing a vision of 
natural man, in the fashion of enlightenment theory, Arendt describes a fluid and 
contingent dimension of political engagement that arises out of the conditions under 
which human beings interact with one another and dwell together on earth.  What human 
activities condition, and in turn are conditioned by, is the world:  “Whatever enters the 
human world of its own accord or is drawn into it by human effort becomes part of the 
human condition.”33  At the heart of Arendt’s ontology is the image of the world as an 
“in-between” that sustains a realm of shared meaning.  Human beings are both “of” and 
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“in” the world.  The world connects and disconnects people; it houses the human species 
on earth in a field of enduring relevance and meaning.  Arendt’s idiosyncratic 
understanding of the world as an “in-between” sets her thought apart from even the most 
decentered intersubjective accounts of plurality. 
As both a grounding condition and a potentiality capacity, activity in the worldly 
in-between entails both “worldliness” and “worldlessness” – and, in the modern era, each 
coheres in a state of world-alienation.  Arendt’s account of ancient Greece uncovers the 
world “between” and “of” other people as the lost raison d’être of politics as such.  The 
model of action as performance is rooted in the world as the abode and sustaining ground 
of human relationships, in their contingency and frailty.  The condition of worldliness is 
natality.  The biological moment of birth marks the arrival of a newcomer into the world 
of others and the introduction of a unique set of relationships and significations to the 
common world of experience.  Worldlessness, Arendt explains, refers to the continual 
loss of the world entailed in the events of death and forgetting.  The condition of 
worldlessness is mortality. 
The connection between worldliness and public space is articulated by Arendt 
when she defines the public realm according to two phenomenal aspects.  The first gives 
the world a feeling of reality:  the eyes and the ears of every person, who sees and hears 
all action performed.  The second is “the world itself, in so far as it is common to all of us 
and distinguished from our privately owned place in it.”34  These two aspects are not 
mutually exclusive:  the presence of spectators gives the objective world its commonality, 
while, in turn, the objectivity of the world gives durability to the realm of spectatorship.  
By qualifying the public as a space of appearance, Arendt is able to distinguish between 
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the world as a passive materiality, and the world as a medium of human interaction, 
illuminated by human spectatorship, which sustains the meaning of human interactions 
precisely because of its capacity to endure beyond the length of one mortal lifetime.   
The immortality of the world is the basis for Arendt’s ‘weak’ epistemological link 
between appearance and reality.  Arendt’s account of the public realm demonstrates a 
deep appreciation of the real as shared and confirmed experience.  In the Human 
Condition, she notes the difference between trust in the reality of one’s own life and trust 
in the reality of the world itself.  While the former hinges on the intensity of immediate 
private sensation, the latter relies on the “permanence and durability of the world.”35  The 
work of homo faber is essential to the durability of the world in its materiality.  In so far 
as the public refers to “the world itself” it consists of a world of durable objects that 
houses human beings in a realm of stability.  The “feeling” of reality, however, arises in 
conjunction with the act of bearing collective witness, giving the quality of commonness 
to the durable.  What is real is what is born common witness to, with common sense 
acting as the measure of the reality of the world.  Public action does not merely disclose 
meaning, but it establishes it as real by making it common.  Through publicly witnessed 
speech and deed, actors “make articulate and call into full existence what otherwise they 
would have to suffer passively anyhow.”36  This “actualization” of what is otherwise 
passive is the instantiation of reality.  
At stake in the Greek model is the survival of individual legacy beyond one’s 
inevitable death.  Being seen and heard by a common audience allows one’s actions and 
words some initial endurance in the memory of all present.  After biological death, 
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immortality is made possible by historians and storytellers.  The full essence of one’s 
identity, then, is not merely the brief insights expressed in public action, but it is what 
“can come into being only when life departs, leaving behind nothing but a story.”37  Thus, 
“the urge toward self-disclosure…became the prototype of action for Greek antiquity and 
influenced, in the form of the so-called agonal spirit, the passionate drive to show one’s 
self in measuring up against others that underlies the concept of politics in city states.”38  
Paradoxically, it is in “the most futile and intangible of human activities” that one 
engages in the agonal struggle for legacy that is the Greek polis.   
The agonist’s competitive struggle for glory and fame is at its base an expression 
of a shared attitude toward the fleeting and partial nature of human endeavors.  This 
attitude and the common “will to lend immortality to greatness” have their origins not in 
the polis, but in the legacy of Homeric impartiality that inspired polis life at its height and 
waned as speech replaced deed as the dominant form of public action.
39
  Coeval with the 
agonist attitude is the historiographer’s sense of a “distinction between the mortality of 
men and the immortality of nature.”40  Arendt notes that this attitude springs from a world 
in which the absolute perishability of all human institutions and endeavors incited a very 
real concern with immortality.  Today’s scientific worldview has ceased to worry about 
the immortality of acts and events, and rather concerns itself with the immortality of the 
species as a whole.  The mimetic transformation of otherwise fleeting occurrences into 
written history elevates human action the greatness and permanence of nature.  Action is 
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the subject matter of history because of its extraordinariness.  Events that stand apart 
from the eternal recurrence of daily life, that interrupt the cycle of necessity, are the 
subject matter of history precisely because of their futility. 
The will to immortal fame with which d’Entrèves characterizes his “expressive” 
model of action is thus consistent with Homeric Greece, while the communicative model 
seems to take its cue from Periclean Athens.  In the polis, Homeric impartiality became a 
form of perspectival objectivity.  The unanimous understanding of greatness that 
underpins the work of the Homeric historiographer gives way to the understanding that 
an event can be seen from an infinite number of viewpoints.  Arendt explains that the 
public of the polis consisted to a large extent of “incessant talk” between citizens.41   
“In a sheer inexhaustible flow of arguments, as the Sophists presented them to 
the citizenry of Athens, the Greek learned to exchange his own viewpoint, his 
own “opinion” … with those of his fellow citizens.  Greeks learned to … look 
upon the same world from one another’s standpoint, to see the same in very 
different and frequently opposing aspects.”42   
In the polis, Arendt suggests, the potential greatness of action, as word and deed, and the 
freedom to act and begin something new transformed into a value of mere speech, and a 
conception of freedom as the freedom of opinion.  Action’s capacity to begin, the 
freedom of spontaneity, is possible in the polis without the help of a poet or historian by 
virtue of the public plurality of actors.   
The freedom of movement, Arendt explains, is “the substance and meaning of all 
things political.”43  In the stories of Homeric kings, the freedom of movement is the 
freedom to go out and begin something new.  Arendt suggests that the exchange of 
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opinion in the polis exhibits a freedom of “mental movement.”44  Its corresponding 
political attitude is the enlarged mentality, by which one removes their subjective 
conditions and relate to the presence and equality of others.  The enlarged mentality here 
corresponds to the revelatory capacity of speech.  Freedom is not the end goal of politics, 
Arendt explains, but is the meaning of the political as such.  The space of freedom is 
analogous with the space of polis.  Its function is revelatory:  “Only in the freedom of our 
speaking with one another does the world, as that about which we speak, emerge in its 
objectivity and visibility from all sides.”45  Freedom is thus, above all, a world-building 
capacity. 
The speech that constitutes the discursive realm of communicative action, 
however, is not action in the form of speech, but action coordinated by speech.  Despite 
its resemblance to opinion exchange in the polis, the deliberative model engages speech 
in the task of agreement, which limits action, but does not constitute it.  Arendt refers to 
the enlarged mentality of polis life in order to depict the notion that the feeling of 
objectivity is congruent with the presence of an irreducible and infinite multiplicity of 
perspectives from which to see.  In the polis, action is productive of an ever-changing 
web of human relationships.  In the communicative model of action, however, the 
enlarged mentality is considered a “procedure for ascertaining intersubjective agreement” 
and thus becomes a method of producing objectivity.
46
  In his developed Theory of 
Communicative Action, Habermas explains that “communicative action designates a type 
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of interaction that is coordinated through speech acts and does not coincide with them.”47  
An important distinction arises from the reduction of speech  from action to action 
coordination:  action’s beginning capacity ceases to be coincident with its revelatory 
capacity.  In this disjunction, action retains a teleological quality. 
It is not action but spectatorship that defines the public realm of performance.  In 
fact, Arendt explains, the space of appearance itself must be established and secured 
before a realm of action can come into being.
48
  The desire for sheer exposure at the hope 
of attaining immortal fame, Arendt suggests, is the defining characteristic of the political 
actor of ancient Greece.  The public space of the polis consists of no more than an 
“organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together for this 
purpose, no matter where they happen to be.”49  Arendt continues, “To be deprived of it 
means to be deprived of reality, which, humanly and politically speaking, is the same as 
appearance.”50  The primacy of appearance in the Greek model suggests that Arendt 
conceives of the public realm as a type of theatrum mundi, a world-stage, instantiated by 
the presence of a witnessing and remembering spectatorship.  In the Human Condition, 
Arendt remarks that “the theater is the political art par excellence; only there is the 
political sphere of human life transported into art.”51  The affinity between the theatre and 
the public realm springs from the fact that action, in each case, arises between people and 
is bound to the sphere of human relationships.  Theatre is the only art that requires the 
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presence of more than one person.  In the theatrum mundi, the walls of the polis are 
analogous to the proscenium arch of a modern theatre space, which carves out and 
signifies a place for the passage and disclosure of being.  The presence of the arch calls to 
witness the spectatorship that reaffirms and actualizes the otherwise “passive” comings 
and goings of the scene. 
As Paul Kottman asserts in his Politics of the Scene, the image of the world-stage 
invokes an ontological claim that informs the constitution of the polis as a space of 
appearance.  What specifically appears are scenes, which Kottman defines as “any 
particular horizon of human interaction, inaugurated by the words and deeds of someone 
or some group, here and now, with the result that a singular relationship or web of 
relationships is brought into being, sustained, or altered among those in the scene.”52  
Occurring in a “here and now,” action as performance discloses an arrangement of 
particularities, brought into a contingent relationship.  Kottman appeals to Arendt’s claim 
that the specific “productivity” of action is its impact on the web of human 
relationships.
53
  In the theatrum mundi, appearance, actualization, and the freedom to 
begin are phenomenologically bound in action’s alteration of the web of relationships.  
The “second birth” that signals emergence into the public realm and discloses “who” one 
is is analogous with the capacity to begin and introduce something new.
54
   
The form of beginning at play in the theatrum mundi is not teleological, but 
augmentative.  One introduces themself to the world, altering the web of relationships, 
and submits their story to realm of worldly things to be judged and remembered.  In a 
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short review of Hermann Broch’s The Death of Virgil (which poetizes the final twenty-
four hours of Virgil’s life), Arendt remarks that life’s activity consummates in a story to 
be told and retold, reflected on, and finally understood.  From the perspective of natality, 
death is not a fate to be feared, but an “achievement” to be anticipated.55  Moreover, the 
moment of action obtains its futurity not from anxiety toward the oblivion of the “not 
yet,” but from the expectation of future reflection on the present moment after it has been 
“no longer.”  Kottman attributes to the scene a futurity in the form of an “anticipatory 
temporality.”56  The scene inaugurates relationships in the “here and now” of the present, 
though it is oriented “toward a future testimony among witnesses from the “original” 
scene.”57  The futurity of action is thus given immediate expression in the person of the 
spectator.  Public action in the theatrum mundi is not incidentally performed before a 
plurality of witnesses, but intentionally performed with the promise of being sealed in the 
memory of the on-looking spectators.  Only after the moment of the performance does 
the spectator (and no transcendent) reciprocate with thoughtful appraisal. 
Arendt’s introduction of action as both a confirmation and a beginning leaves the 
distinction between word and deed deceptively ambiguous.  Though she initially 
introduces action as “word and deed,” she uses action to refer to deed, and speech to refer 
to word, in reference to action’s ontological ground.  In this brief analytic of action, the 
capacity for action as deed to begin actualizes the human condition of natality, with each 
new beginning echoing the first beginning that each of us are at the moment of our birth.  
Speech, on the other hand, is the actualization of the human condition of plurality, 
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differentiating individuals in their unique identity.  With this distinction, Arendt suggests 
that speech is a revelation and action is a beginning.  She adds, somewhat mysteriously, 
that “many, and even most acts, are performed in the manner of speech” and that 
“speechless action would no longer be action.”58  This understanding of action bound to 
the essence of the human condition captures action in an originary form, as the Greek 
archein, which means both to begin and to lead.
59
  As the actualization of natality and 
plurality, action reveals the interdependence between the individual and others.  The 
politician as a beginner is dependent on the reception of others to acknowledge, carry out, 
or dispute his actions.  The fact of plurality leaves all beginning spontaneous and 
unpredictable.  
By Arendt’s account, freedom is the originary meaning of politics.  The reason 
for politics, however, the answer to the existential question of plurality and natality, is the 
preservation of the world as a realm of continuity.  While she understands freedom in 
terms of acting and appearing in the political realm, her entire political thought aims to 
“preserve worldliness at all costs.”60  For the same reason that action’s spontaneity and 
unpredictability ground human freedom, they also render the world in continual need of 
renewal. 
The moment a person acts into a public space, his action ceases to be his own and 
becomes a chain of consequences, resonating in the mutual reciprocity of the action of 
others.  This is the temporal distinction between action and work, and consequently why 
Arendt calls courage to venture unto the public realm the political virtue par excellence.
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The craftsman must have some idea, if not a rigid blueprint, of his finished product 
before he begins production.  At the end of the production process, the artifact introduced 
into the world, though new and certainly a potential beginning, is the result of a past 
projection and the end point of a process that is predictable.  Action, on the other hand, is 
wholly unpredictable.  It begins a process that is out of the hands of the individual actor 
the moment it comes into being.  The meaning or significance of an action cannot be 
grasped, then, by the actor himself.  Arendt explains that “action reveals itself fully only 
to the storyteller, that is, to the backward glance of the historian, who indeed always 
knows better what it was all about than the participants.”61  The unpredictability of action 
demands that the constitution of the public realm must in some way take a conservative 
shape.   
The Greek model of public space as an immortal realm of memory, Arendt 
explains, is one “solution” to this frailty.62  The dominant solution, however, takes the 
form of the elimination of action altogether.  The Platonic devaluation of the vita activa, 
and correlate substitution of action for fabrication, inspired the Roman political model 
and became definitive for the western tradition of political theory until the modern age.  It 
is not until the modern age, however, that the loss of a public space for action is realized 
in the form of pervasive world-alienation, characterized as a “twofold flight from the 
earth into the universe and from the world into the self.”63  The first flight is primarily 
entailed in the scientific worldview that adopts the universal standpoint as its own, and 
the second is characteristic of life in modern mass-society.  However, both flights herald 
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a constitutive loss at the heart of the modern world, which a recovery of action as such 
only begins to mitigate.  The “atrophy of the space of appearance and the withering of 
common sense” signifies the simultaneous loss of world and reality.64 In other words, it is 
not the imbalance between acting and fabricating in the vita activa that constitutes the 
loss of the political, but the separation of doing and thinking that was confirmed by the 
modern age’s reversal of the traditional order.  As a facet of perception and Arendt’s term 
for thinking within a plurality from the position of a disinterested and critical judge, 
common sense is the mental faculty that ensures the commonality of the world and the 
reality of worldly appearances. 
The attempt to recover action as the capacity to self-disclose and to initiate 
something new is certainly worthwhile in the context of the traditional substitution of 
making for acting.  However, the hierarchical inversion of action and fabrication in the 
vita activa is not the only culprit in the “case” of the loss of the public-political realm.  
Arendt’s account in the Human Condition of this reversal within the vita activa is 
bookended by the ancient origin and modern loss of its traditional constellation.  The 
traditional hierarchy between the vita activa and the vita contemplativa is rendered 
meaningless in the modern era, which is consummated in another turn, both between and 
within the active life and the life of the mind.  The modern replacement of contemplating 
with fabricating, in the form of the science experiment, reverses the hierarchy between 
the vita activa and the vita contemplativa.  The dominance of scientific reason over 
common understanding eliminates the role of common sense as a faculty of judgment 
altogether.  A close examination of this aspect of the modern turn reveals the deeper 
stakes of any attempt to recover a space of political action.   
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What has been lost is not merely action as self-disclosure and beginning, nor is 
the modern state of world alienation limited to individual entrapment in a social realm of 
invisibility or distorted disclosure.  What has been lost is the faith in appearances that 
grounds the reality of the public realm as a theatrum mundi, and with it the role of 
contemplation as passive beholding has succumbed to the constant movement of the 
process of the scientific experiment.  The quietness and tranquility of contemplation that 
was traditionally guarded by the metaphysical hierarchy ceases to have any place at all 
within the modern arrangement that equates thought with hypothesis, and requires 
experimental “acting into nature” for the confirmation of knowledge.  The result is the 
displacement of the objective world with a set of natural and historical processes of 
increasing momentum and the loss of a temporal balance that is only sustainable through 
a reciprocal relationship between doing and thinking.  The liberatory aim of recovering 
public action finds the context of its struggle in the larger and more fundamental modern 
loss of this relationship. 
The Human Condition, Arendt’s phenomenological prolegomena to a political 
theory proper, is a response, though not a solution, to the capacities of the modern 
scientific and mechanistic world views.  The modern world, which commenced with the 
development and use of the atom bomb, has become a world of unprecedented possibility 
in which the unthinkable limits of technological progress are actualized on a daily basis.  
Where speech is bound to the particulars of experience, the mathematical limits of the 
scientific imagination overleap the ability of an individual mind to comprehend the 
meaning of its effects.  In response to the notion that, by landing on the moon, mankind 
has escaped its enslavement to the earth, Arendt warns that “we, who are earth-bound 
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creatures and have begun to act as though we were dwellers of the universe, will forever 
be unable to understand, that is, to think and speak about the things which nevertheless 
we are able to do.”65  The human artifice currently risks overrunning and wrecking its 
original conditions of possibility as the human capacity for action now overwhelms and 
silences our capacities for speech and understanding.  This crisis is facilitated by a 
predominant state of thoughtlessness, which Arendt describes as “the heedless 
recklessness or hopeless confusion or complacent repetition of “truths,” which have 
become trivial and empty.”66  She thus endeavors, in the Human Condition, to “think 
what we are doing” without slipping into the rhetorical language of global narratives, 
metaphysical fallacies, tropes, or clichés.  By abandoning such outside appeal, Arendt 
aims to “thoughtfully” consider the originary activities that condition – i.e. ground, limit, 
and potentiate – the human experience. 
The vita activa, as Arendt conceives of it, refers to those originary activities of the 
human condition.  Work, action, and labor, are “permanent” capacities, “which cannot be 
irretrievably lost so long as the human condition itself is not changed.”67  The term can be 
traced back, however, to Aristotle’s bios politikos as the life devoted to public-political 
matters, in which the vita activa may as well have been analogous to praxis, the only free 
way of life available to human beings.  Work and labor, even when taken up voluntarily, 
are both bound, in some way, to material need.  The completely free life was a life of 
action, for its complete emancipation from necessity.  It is the activity that alone 
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sustained the bios politikos and the “Greek understanding of polis life,” which, Arendt 
reminds us, “denoted a very special and freely chosen form of political organization.”68   
This originary understanding of the vita activa is lost to the philosophical tradition 
after the polis, at which point it loses its specifically political character, as it denotes 
worldly engagement in general.  Rather than work and labor adhering in opposition to the 
freedom of action, action becomes bound up with the necessity of all earthly activities.  
Work, labor, and action become the vita activa in opposition, and subordination, to the 
vita contemplativa, the contemplative life of the philosopher.  Here, the vita activa is 
represented by the movement and unquiet evaded in the stillness and tranquility of the 
vita contemplativa.  The vita activa thus inherits its particular traditional meaning from 
the “primacy of contemplation over acting.”69  The Human Condition can be understood 
as Arendt’s attempt to grasp a constellation of the vita activa that is free from the 
metaphysical hierarchy implied by both the tradition and its critics: 
“My contention is simply that the enormous weight of contemplation in the 
traditional hierarchy has blurred the distinctions and articulations within the vita 
activa itself and that, appearances not withstanding, this condition has not been 
changed essentially by the modern break with the tradition and the eventual 
reversal of its hierarchical order in Marx and Nietzsche.”70 
 
Work, action, and labor comprise the still intact conceptual framework of the vita activa, 
which remains constant even after philosophy has been turned “upside down.” 
 When appealing to Arendt’s conception of action as a lost form of political 
practice, which is the premise of both the communication and performance models of 
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action – it is crucial to recall her aim to reclaim the vita activa from its traditional 
subordination.  Through the traditional lens, the raison d’etre of polis life becomes 
insignificant.  The public realm was the Greek answer to human mortality and the 
cyclical futility of particular human affairs.  As a realm of witness and remembrance, 
public space preserves the most futile and intangible of human activities from inevitable 
oblivion.  Philosophical contemplation, modeled by the philosopher who turns from the 
dark cave of worldly affairs in Plato’s Republic, is bound up in an experience of the 
eternal.  The priority of the ideal realm of the mind eliminates the need for the lesser 
notion of striving for worldly immortality, though it “originally had been the spring and 
center of the vita activa.”71  With the vita activa and the bios politikos demoted to the role 
of “handmaidens” to contemplation, the worldly vitality of action and appearance in the 
public realm is historically lost to experience.  Arendt thus introduces the Human 
Condition with the birth of the tradition.  Appropriately, she closes with its end. 
 The Platonic turn of theoria away from praxis is succeeded in the modern era by 
two further transformations of the constellation.  The condition of these modern turns is 
the state of world alienation, which, Arendt explains, was solidified in the seventeenth 
century by three events.  First, the discovery of the new world effectively shrunk the vast 
expanse of geography surrounding the human abode and made it possible for man to 
segment and take hold of his dwelling place definitively.
72
  Distance has since yielded to 
speed in a radical way, rendering the spatiality of the world meaningless.  Second, the 
Protestant Reformation and the correlate growth of capitalization set in motion cycling 
processes of accumulation and expropriation that dispossessed a growing laboring class 
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of private property, which is the material marker of man’s location in the human abode 
and safeguard of his intimate familial sphere from the realm of the social as a family writ 
large, so to speak.  Third, the invention of the telescope – the simple “addition of a new 
implement to man’s already large arsenal of tools” – had perhaps the most astounding 
effect of the three.  By peering into the heavens themselves, Galileo was able to confirm 
Copernicus and, more drastically, seal the new locus of the Archimedian point in the 
human perspective itself.  Arendt remarks, “The modern astrophysical world view, which 
began with Galileo, and its challenge to the adequacy of the senses to reveal reality, have 
left us a universe of whose qualities we know no more than the way they affect our 
measuring instruments.”73  By gaining the universal vantage point, we lose the distance 
between ourselves and the world. 
 World alienation is, perhaps ironically, solidified in a reversal of the hierarchical 
order between the vita activa and the vita contemplativa, with the active role of the 
scientist displacing the contemplative role of the philosopher.  The telescope, and the 
consequent ability to shift the human perspective from the terrestrial to that of the 
heavens, gave expression to the subjectivism of world-alienated philosophy and the 
Cartesian doubt that replaced traditional wonder during the turn.  The scientific method 
of confirming knowledge through experiment does not redeem faith in appearances, but 
confirms the philosopher’s doubt.  The experiment produces appearances that conform to 
the human standpoint and do not reveal the world, but confirm or reject the original 
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hypothesis of the scientist.  That “man can at least [and only] know what he makes 
himself,” Arendt asserts, is the accepted attitude of the modern age.74   
Within the now dominant vita activa, fabrication rises to the position occupied by 
contemplation, as the “making” of reality in the experiment.  The mechanistic worldview 
of homo faber dominates as the “being” that used to appear to the mind’s eye now lies 
hidden in the form of natural processes.  Thus, processes, “and not ideas, the models and 
shapes of things to be, become the guide for the making and fabricating activities of 
homo faber in the modern age.”75  In the process of the experiment, however, the logic of 
fabrication loses its telos and its principle of utility, since the material outcome of an 
experiment is incidental to the goal of confirming knowledge.  In the final modern 
transformation of the vita activa, homo faber concedes his victory to animal laborans. 
Though Arendt’s endeavor to “think what we are doing” famously excludes the 
theme of thinking itself, she closes the Human Condition with a mysterious but pointed 
remark about thought, which has largely disappeared from the modern era.  She suggests 
that thought is the prerogative of the many, not the few, and its possibility is contingent 
on the actualization of plurality in a state of political freedom.  She speculates that this 
fact “is not irrelevant for the future of man...” 
“For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the 
extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita 
activa, it might be well that thinking as such would surpass them all.”76 
 
Arendt’s suggestion that the realm of thought may, in fact, be more active than the active 
life itself, points to an understanding of the vita contemplativa free of its traditional 
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fetters.  This remark suggests that thought is no tranquil state, nor is it an excess to 
worldly life.  Like work, action, and labor, the articulations of thought suggest a 
necessary motion that sustains human being.  Arendt also warns here that the modern 
displacement of contemplation does not eliminate the realm of thought, but converts it to 
the form of acting into nature.  More broadly, this passage points to the possibility that 
what holds true for the vita activa holds true for the vita contemplativa.  That is, those 
capacities of thought that are contingent to the human condition – which she only later 
thematizes as thinking, willing, and judging – are likewise permanent and imply a 
similarly concealed originary balance.  If action and contemplation “correspond to two 
altogether different central human concerns,” as she initially suspects they do, then 
perhaps action needs confinement to its domain of political freedom in order to release 
thought back its proper realm of the imagination.  The modern transgression of 
contemplation into the territory of the vita activa reveals horrific danger concealed in 
most vulnerable of human capacities.
77
  Science and technology have advanced, in a brief 
expanse of time, to the point of being able to end all life on the face of the planet.  Such 
an abasement homo faber’s utilitarian ethic is possible only under conditions in which 
thinking and doing are decisively incongruent.   
 While the Human Condition is Arendt’s recovery of an original thematization of 
the vita activa, in Between Past and Future and in Life of the Mind, Arendt pursues the 
task of thinking through the vita contemplativa without presuming its traditional or 
modern shape.  Her emphasis in each text is temporal:  thought is the space in which we 
navigate the gap between past and future.  The vita contemplativa in its traditional form is 
philosophical theoria, the contemplation of eternal truths.  As theoria, it is completely 
                                                          
77
 Ibid., 324. 
 39 
 
unconcerned with worldly affairs.  However, as Arendt articulates at the end of the 
Human Condition, the modern iteration of the life of the mind ceases to be “of the mind” 
after the dominance of scientific experimentation.  Her account is bleak.  In the modern 
era, the philosopher is dispossessed of his theoria.  The world-adhering play of scientific 
thought, which acts into nature and fabricates natural processes, introduces into the world 
a radical amount of change at an unprecedented momentum.  In very plain terms:  we are 
unable to “think what we are doing” because we are “doing” faster than we can possibly 
think. 
The decisive end of the Platonic tradition came when the horrific novelty of 
twentieth century totalitarian terror not only rendered traditional concepts explanatorily 
useless, but exploded them altogether.  The growing condition of thoughtlessness springs 
from the double predicament of modern thought:  that the philosophical tradition bestows 
no categories that aid in understanding the novelty of world events and that the growing 
dominance of math and science not only took on a transgressive form of action, but they 
have obscured all other modes of thought with their one.  This is the “parting company” 
of thought and reality that renders reality “opaque for the light of thought.”78   
Decades before thematizing the vita contemplativa as thinking, willing, and 
judging, Arendt appeals to the activity of understanding, which mimics the role that 
judgment plays in her later work.  She defines understanding as “an unending activity by 
which, in constant change and variation, we come to terms with and reconcile ourselves 
to reality, that is, try to be at home in the world.”79  Understanding produces no results, 
but reconciles a person to the fact of having been born into the world a stranger.  The 
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modern collapse of contemplation of things eternal and the understanding of worldly 
particulars into scientific knowledge could not do away with the need of understanding to 
find meaning in the world and reconcile with natality.  The scientific reduction of events 
to “results” and the substitution of logicality for common sense confirm the displacement 
of aesthetic judgment by mathematical thought.  Arendt remarks that mathematical laws 
are the only form of “common” sense left. 
Arendt calls on Kafka’s “He” (in at least three texts) to illuminate the burden of 
crisis on the task of understanding.  The parable depicts the struggle to situate oneself 
historically and temporally in the aftermath of an inconceivable crisis.  In it, a man is 
positioned on a road between two antagonists, one blocking the road ahead, and the other 
blocking the road behind.  He battles with each of them and employs each in his fight 
against the other.  The man’s dream, Kafka imagines, is to “jump out of the fighting line 
and be promoted, on account of his experience in fighting, to the position of umpire over 
his antagonists in their fight with each other.”80   
On the one hand, this story depicts the kind of thoughtlessness that results from 
the crisis of the mind in the moment after action has “run its course” and there remain no 
tangible guideposts to aid a reflective understanding of the event.
81
  On the other hand, 
the story presents the temporal crisis that always already informs the task of 
understanding.  The task presented to the life of the mind, according to Arendt, is the task 
of bridging the gap between past and future.  Observed from the human “terrestrial” 
vantage point – to borrow the language of the Human Condition – the flow of time is not 
a continuous succession.  Time is an abyssal gap in which mankind stands and “keeps in 
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existence” by virtue of his aggressive position.82  The dream of stepping out and 
occupying the position of umpire represents the theoretical standpoint of the 
metaphysician, or the universal Archimedian point occupied by modern science.  Arendt 
remarks, however, that Kafka’s parable misses the deflective role of interference in the 
fighting match.  “Thinking space” is Arendt’s early term for the deflection within the 
initial antagonism that is inevitably caused by mankind’s original insertion between the 
two forces.  It is the condition of temporal being, that human beings break up the flow of 
forces so that time is no linearity at all, but rather a rift, produced by the diagonal force of 
thought.   
Arendt’s account offers a glimpse of the way in which the common world hinges 
on each of its individual members for endurance.  Thinking space is not merely a site of 
antagonism, but it is that precious realm “into which the trains of thought, of 
remembrance and anticipation, save whatever they touch from the ruin of historical and 
biographical time.”83  Thinking space is ineffable and personal.  It lasts for each the 
length of his lifetime and cannot be shared with others without metaphorical mediation.  
It is the withdrawal from worldly activities that allows for reconciliation with them.  Thus 
“each new generation, indeed every human being as he inserts himself between an 
infinite past and an infinite future, must discover and ploddingly pave it anew.”84  For 
Arendt, each human being, born already uninitiated into the world of other people, is 
presented with the task of “settling down in this gap between past and future” – of 
dwelling in thinking space in order to situate himself in the historical moment from the 
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vantage point of an observer of the forces of past and future.  She takes up her own 
historical vantage point in Between Past and Future, asserting that her main goal in 
writing each essay is to concern herself with how to move in the gap between past and 
future. 
Peg Birmingham draws a thorough account of the temporality of natality from 
Arendt’s repeated use of the Kafka parable.  The image of the man caught between two 
antagonists, for Birmingham, “describes the condition of thought that has always 
existed.”85  The traditional dominance of theoria, as philosophical contemplation, has 
obscured this originary condition of the mind, its relation to the “fact” of natality, and the 
contingency it bestows on all worldly occurrences.  The parable lends itself to a 
conceptualization of natality as the principle of a common humanity.  We are, through 
and through, beginners.   
The parable also lends itself to an account of the natal temporality of the present.  
All action is the introduction of something new, even when it appeals to or even repeats a 
past act.  Arendt identifies thinking space as a diagonal force that springs from the 
antagonistic meeting of past and future forces.  The diagonal line of thought, for 
Birmingham, represents a “deflected” force that joins the past and future only by 
disrupting their common flow.  The antagonistic struggle is contingent on our interfering 
presence:  “the past is an anteriority that constantly introduces an aberration or a 
difference into the future through this deflective or disjunctive present.”86  The past bears 
on the present as a force, as a foreign anteriority.  It is recoverable to the present, as 
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Benjamin states, only through a process citation and translation.  Action in the present 
does not spring from the past but from the abyssal rupture between past and future.  The 
deflected origin of action means that action may appeal to an origin, but it itself has none.  
Action that conserves meaning and values still has its roots in the condition of natality:  
“The process of reinscription and revision – the insertion or intervention of something 
that takes on new meaning – occurs in the temporal break of the deflected present.”87   
Where Birmingham grasps the “process of reinscription and revision” of an 
abstract anterior past, Anne O’Byrne conceptualizes the temporality of natality in terms 
of syncopation.  The intervention of the past that occurs in the temporality of the 
deflected present is the moment of recovery of origins that discloses the meaning of an 
action.  Syncopated temporality refers to the “mode of being in time that can grasp itself 
only belatedly, and only in the context of an anteriority we have to struggle to 
understand.”88  The present is deflected because of the endless need for negotiation and 
reconciliation with the past events, which come to fruition and obtain meaningfulness 
only after they are no longer.  Implied in the spontaneity of new beginnings is their 
retroactive emergence as beginnings.  Action “turns out to have been” a beginning.  
O’Byrne binds the deflected origin to the bodily moment of one’s birth.  The initial 
emergence into the world in the event of one’s own birth is their first beginning.  But it 
remains “a moment irretrievably lost” to experience.89  We do not remember our own 
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births.  We are always already with others before we can grasp ourselves as finite 
creatures.
90
 
The syncopated temporality of natality suggests a conception of understanding 
that recovers the present in relation to the past and thus bridges the temporal rupture 
without evading it.  By appealing to the belated completion of action’s disclosure, 
O’Byrne depicts the rupture of the present in necessary relation to the structure of action.  
For the same reason that Kottman conceives of the action of the scene as an anticipatory 
event, performed with an awareness of future audience, O’Byrne establishes action’s 
belatedness in relation to the deflected “thinking space” of the present.  Syncopated 
temporality adheres in the relationship between actor and spectator.  It drafts the moment 
of understanding in terms of the beat between acts that allows for awareness of what one 
is doing.  In the modern world, without the aid of tradition, we experience our thrownness 
into the temporal rupture compulsorily.   
It is vital to note that Arendt uses the term “tradition” in two respects.  
Throughout Arendt’s corpus, tradition plays a sort of tyrannous role; it bridges the gap 
between past and future compulsorily, enabling thoughtlessness by emancipating 
individuals from needing to occupy the thinking space between past and future.  The 
tradition most referenced by Arendt is the Platonic tradition that began when the bios 
politikos was subordinated to the vita contemplativa, destining political action to limited 
and reduced appearance in the dominant discourse.  In the preface to Between Past and 
Future, however, the term is analogous to “testament” in the sense of Rene Char’s 1946 
aphorism, “Notre heritage n’ést précédé d’aucun testament.”  Our inheritance was left to 
us by no testament.  Arendt credits the philosophical tradition with covering over 
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originary political beginnings, equating it with a fundamental loss.  Tradition plays the 
opposite role in the Char aphorism.  The realm of freedom that sprang up during the 
French Résistance disappeared after the end of the war precisely because no tradition was 
put in place to guide memory and save the treasure of public freedom for future 
generations: 
Without testament or, to resolve the metaphor, without tradition – which selects 
and names, which hands down and preserves, which indicates where the 
treasures are and what their worth is – there seems to be no willed continuity in 
time and hence, humanly speaking, neither past nor future, only sempiturnal 
change of the world and the biological cycle of living creatures in it. 
 
Tradition provides a framework that is integral to the task of thinking between past and 
future.  Without guideposts for remembering, the events of the world are lost to oblivion. 
Tradition as testament is an act of remembering that ties the activity of thought to 
a particular scene of worldly experience.  Here, the position of the spectator remains 
impartial, though it is not removed from the action.  Spectatorship is a particular kind of 
action that affirms the passing of the scene “not by the semantic content of their discourse 
but rather by their reciprocal confirmation of one another’s eyes through the act of 
speaking.”91  The revelatory capacity of the scene adheres spatially in the moment of 
appearance.  Action performed in the theatrum mundi achieves balanced syncopation 
with the reflection of the spectatorship.  Its revelatory capacity adheres immediately.  
Action in the modern age, as the “exclusive prerogative of the scientists,” is no longer 
performed into the medium of a plurality of witnesses.  The scientist who acts into nature 
does so without spectatorship, without revelation, and thus widens the gap between being 
and knowing sustained in the temporality of natality.  The communicative model of 
action misses the phenomenal experience of shared spectatorship as an integral step to the 
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flow of public dialogue.  Discourse, for Arendt, occurs in response to events that beg us 
to understand them. 
Natality and mortality, worldliness and worldlessness, come hand in hand.  
Arendt’s epilogue to her “Introduction into Politics” reflects on natality’s existential 
determination of the human condition, which, without a stable public-political realm is a 
desert.  The world is a desert, Arendt explains, not because it is inherently meaningless, 
but because it depends on the most frail and futile of man’s activities for meaningful 
endurance.  For continuity, the world needs beginners to continually renew its role as the 
human abode on earth.  Tradition can become a means of escaping life in the desert; 
however, if tradition is not taken up as testament, from the standpoint of a witness of the 
past as well as that of a beginner, the virtue of endurance is lost, and action loses its 
capacity for renewal and its esteemed role in the vita activa:  “Only those who can endure 
the passion of living under desert conditions can be trusted to summon up in themselves 
the courage that lies at the root of action, of becoming an active being.”92  Because the 
world is “a human artifice whose potential immortality is always subject to the mortality 
of those who build it and the natality of those who come to live in it,” it relies on human 
action to sustain it in the mode of beginning.
93
  This is different from grasping action’s 
freedom in accordance with its capacity to introduce novelty into the world.  In Arendt’s 
picture of the desert world, action’s role is quite conservative. 
  Arendt closes her meditation on the desert with a revision of the fundamental 
existential question articulated by Heidegger, “Why is there anything at all and not rather 
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nothing?”  She asks, “Why is there anybody at all and not rather nobody?”94  This is the 
precisely non-nihilistic question, she explains, that arises from objective conditions of 
nihilism, from a world in which politics has lost its raison d’être.  While Arendt does not 
endeavor an explicit answer to this question, one can read her entire corpus as a working 
toward the answer.  In short, the reason why there is anybody at all, and not rather 
nobody, is the endurance of the world.  The first fact of human being is plural being – 
that “men and not man inhabit the earth” – sustained by and sustaining of the world.  The 
meaning of politics is freedom; its raison d’être is the world, and the plurality who 
comprise and sustain it. 
  
                                                          
94
 Ibid., 204. 
 48 
 
CHAPTER IV 
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION AND TEMPORALITY 
The Greek model of the public space of appearances, centered on the task of 
preserving the world through memory and witness, cannot be more relevant in an age that 
has lost the capacity to “think” what it is doing.  The syncopated temporality of natality, 
as the gap between action and understanding, requires the public realm to be a space of 
appearance and disclosure.  The deliberative model’s restriction of action to the 
coordination of individual ends, however, troubles the notion of the public as a realm of 
continuity.  The participants in the discursive public realm are deliberators, not 
spectators, who negotiate aims and interests.  Habermas, D’Entrèves, and Benhabib each 
invoke Arendt’s appropriation of the sensus communis as a procedure for obtaining 
agreement among participants about the course of action.  By treating the sensus 
communis as a bridge between theory and action, they fail to recognize the need to 
reconcile with the past, and evade the temporality of natality at play in all action. 
The “enlarged mentality” that Arendt evokes in her illustration of perspectival 
objectivity in the polis suggests a different arch to task of judgment from the syncopated 
reconciliation with the past of the lone spectator.  She later develops the concept in terms 
of Kant’s sensus communis, which makes potential agreement with others the condition 
of judgment.  To enlarge one’s thought is to disregard self-interest and to put oneself “in 
the place of any other man.”95  Arendt invokes the sensus communis to illustrate the 
general standpoint of the spectator as a world-spectator, rather than a subject.  One adopts 
an enlarged mentality in order to take up a standpoint from which to judge.  Arendt 
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explains that, though for Kant the faculty of judgment is the “middleman” between theory 
and practice, the condition of enlarged mentality cannot prescribe actions:  “it is a 
viewpoint from which to look upon, to watch, to form judgments, or, as Kant himself 
says, to reflect on human affairs.  It does not tell one how to act.”96  The sensus 
communis refers to the factor of publicity that is required for critical thinking – that is, for 
reflective engagement with the past. 
D’Entrèves acknowledges the reflective position of the spectator, but denies its 
political relevance.  The moment of understanding, in which one reconciles themselves to 
the past, he contends, is “a component of the life of the mind, the faculty through which 
the privileged spectators can recover meaning from the past and reconcile us to what 
happened.”97  The sensus communis, on the other hand, is “a feature of political life as 
such” that directs the action of individuals in the public realm.  In the model of 
communicative action, the sensus communis does not refer to an abstract general 
standpoint.  Rather, it is taken up as a procedure for determining the validity of opinion 
and the legitimacy of action.  By gearing public exchange toward the end goal of 
agreement, the communicative model shifts the plurality of standpoints to a uniform 
understanding, built on recognition and contestation of individual viewpoints. 
In the Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas develops the deliberative 
procedure in detail.  Communicative action, he explains, presupposes a conception of 
language  
“as a medium of uncurtailed communication whereby speakers and hearers, out 
of the context of their preinterpreted lifeworld, refer simultaneously to things in 
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the objective, social, and subjective worlds in order to negotiate common 
definitions of the situation.”98 
 
Through persuasive deliberation, participants in the discursive public realm appeal to the 
force of validity behind their claims.  Through unimpaired communication, with the 
practical aim toward mutual understanding assumed throughout, individuals define and 
order the objective, social, and subjective worlds.  In coming to mutual understanding, 
participants can “coordinate their actions” and “pursue their particular aims.”99  
Teleologically structured action is thus implied in Habermas’s theory.  Communicative 
action is not action as such, but a process for coordinating action with respect to the 
varied perspectives of the entire group. 
Communicative action is grounded in a formal pragmatics that begins with pure 
types of “linguistically mediated interaction,” or speech acts.  The rational ground of 
communicative action finds expression in respect to these forms, each contestable 
according to a corresponding form of validity.  Constative speech acts are oriented to 
reaching understanding about the objective world.  The validity of a constative speech act 
follows from the truth of its propositions.  Normatively regulated speech acts are oriented 
toward reaching understanding about the “social world” of interpersonal relationships.  
They appeal to a sense of rightness for validity.  Dramaturgical action – performative 
(expressive) speech acts – are oriented toward reaching understanding about the actor’s 
subjective world.  The measure of validity for these acts is sincerity.   
By delimiting each distinct ground of validity, Habermas is able to develop a 
formal theory of intersubjectively constituted legitimation.  Communicative action as 
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action coordinated by understanding, agreement, and mutual recognition of validity 
claims produces a ground of legitimacy contingent to the reason of each participant.  By 
appealing to immediate and intersubjective grounds, as opposed to transcendent religious 
precepts, philosophic dogma, or a theory of contractual consent, the theory of 
communicative action, as Thomas McCarthy notes in his introduction, conceptualizes a 
realm of rationality that promises an “emancipatory effect on traditional habits of 
thought.”100  This emancipation, however, is a double-edged sword.  By appealing to 
rational grounds, however, the Habermasian model of communicative action distances 
itself from experience the moment it makes room for action. 
The sensus communis of the theatrum mundi, however, is immediately bound to 
experience.  Common sense is not merely a procedure for attaining agreement, but it is 
the “sixth sense” that binds the other five senses together.  The critical position of the 
disinterested judge hinges on the initial capacity of common sense as a faculty of 
perception.  It does not follow thought, as d’Entrèves suggests, but enables it by opening 
the individual to a world of particulars.  Understanding common sense as a faculty of 
perception, i.e. disclosure, brings to light the affinity between seeing and thinking and the 
original relation between the activity of theoria and the position the theatai – spectators 
of the theatre.   
Common sense is the faculty of thought and vision that exposes the individual to 
the ontological horizon of the scene.  It grounds the reflective judgment that is “capable 
of arriving at its own norms and principles rather than acquiescing in what is given by the 
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prevailing historical reality.”101  Public action owes its self-legitimatizing function to the 
common sense of the witnessing spectator.  As María Pía Lara points out, for both Kant 
and Arendt, judgment is entailed in the processes of appearing and perceiving.  It is not 
instantiated through communication, as the deliberative model suggests, but it is 
presupposed in the notion of communicability as such.
102
  What becomes communicable, 
by virtue of common sense, is an interpretive understanding, formed by one’s reflective 
judgment.  It is not a determinant or a priori judgment, but an account or narrative of a 
scene.  From the critical standpoint of the spectator-as-judge, “we understand that things 
have happened in the way a story describes them.”103  By binding critical thinking and 
world disclosure and by making scenes attestable (and not contestable), the sensus 
communis is the condition of speech’s revelatory capacity.    
Brought into the context of Arendt’s theory of action, the model of 
communicative rationality appeals to action’s capacity for freedom, albeit within a 
disparate ontological framework than the performance model.  The theatrum mundi 
houses action as both a beginning and a disclosure of “who” one is in the horizon of the 
scene and the context of the spatial disclosure before spectatorship.  In this case, action as 
a beginning can be thought of as a contribution to the fleeting realm of events, which is 
then taken up by others who, in retrospect, ascertain its meaning and significance.  In the 
model of communicative action, however, action is construed as a teleological beginning.  
It does not act into a medium of other people, but rather depends on the unanimous 
approval for permission to begin.  In intersubjective communication, the identity of who 
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one is, and the identity of the world, at that, is not disclosed phenomenologically, but is 
rationally agreed and decided upon. 
Villa contends that the pragmatic aim of agreement defeats the constitution of the 
public as a plurality.  To this, Benhabib remarks that they both agree that political debate 
is an ends-constitutive process.  This, after all, is the defining characteristic of the 
freedom of action and the instrumentality of work, which does not constitute its end, but 
rather disappears into it.  She rejects Villa’s claim, however, that the goal of politics is 
not consensus.  Villa argues that the ethos of agreement, in fact, instrumentalizes action, 
to which Benhabib contends that Villa misunderstands Habermas and the status of 
communicative validity.  In deliberation, the other is treated as an end-in-themselves, 
which eliminates the possibility of instrumentalization in communicative discourse.
104
   
 The divergence of these two scholars on the role of communicative action reveals 
their difference, and not agreement, about the notion of action as an ends-constitutive 
process.  Villa’s understanding of the theatricality of appearance suggests that he allies 
with Arendt when she locates the particular “productivity” of action in the instantiation 
and confirmation of a web of human relationships.
105
  By Villa’s reading, action 
constitutes its own end, while Benhabib’s, and Habermas’s, Kantianism suggests that 
ends constitute action.  Whether or not Benhabib is correct in her claim that Villa simply 
misinterprets communicative action theory, Villa’s wariness of evoking the sensus 
communis as a bridge between discourse and action is well-founded.  
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Concluding Remarks: 
 Reconsideration of the model of communicative action from the perspectives of 
the theatrum mundi and natality’s syncopated temporality leaves me with three 
contentions about the temporality of action in the structure of deliberation: 
 First, the elevation of common sense from a weak epistemology to a strong 
epistemology removes action from its syncopated relationship with thought.  The 
enlarged mentality as a condition of impartial spectatorship supports the formation of 
judgments that are reflectively bound to experience.  By taking inspiration from the event 
of action, the spectator-as-judge develops opinions in narrative structure, insofar as they 
appeal to relationships and principles disclosed by scenes.  The communicative model 
elevates the enlarged mentality to a strong notion of perspectivality as the determiner of 
objectivity, and transforms Kant’s condition of “potential” agreement with others into a 
hard condition for the validity of judgments.  Furthermore, it gives agreement a rational 
basis by appealing to three grounds of validity:  factual truth, normative rightness, and the 
sincerity of the speaker.  This model renders every standpoint contestable, defeating the 
phenomenological structure of disclosure in the first place.  More importantly, this model 
detaches the judgment that grounds action from the worldly experience of the spectator.  
Each moment of agreement is a rational refounding that conceals its contingent historical 
grounds.  In such a structure, there is no room for the syncopated relationship between 
thinking and doing, as the temporal abyss of natality is sustained irreparably. 
 Second, the communicative model collapses the performer-spectator relationship 
into a uniform group of participants.  The substance of participation is neither acting nor 
spectating, but deliberation about the limits of action:  communicative action serves a 
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coordinative function.  By failing to acknowledge the space of appearance in which the 
performer-spectator relationship adheres, the communicative model sustains the modern 
loss of the vita activa and the vita contemplativa in their “proper” senses.  The modern 
turn from thinking to doing, which leaves action the sole prerogative of the scientist, 
dispossesses action of its spatial constitution and thought of its temporal constitution.  
The reciprocal balance between doing and thinking can only find recovery in the spatial-
temporal horizon of the scene, that is, in the theatrum mundi. 
 Third, the communicative action model defines freedom according to the strictly 
initiatory capacity of action, and it elevates freedom from its role as the meaning of 
politics to the goal of politics.  The futurity of action in the communicative model is not 
anticipatory, as in the agonal model, but projective.  Communicative action coordinates 
teleological action and remains bound to the Kantian logic of construing the subject as an 
end-in-himself.  However, if public space is to support the redemptive task of thinking 
space, then it must also be an opening between past and future, i.e. a space of memory.  
Performance, in its affinity to dramatic mimesis, is the form of active memory that 
recovers the past in a narrative and preserves it from ruin.  Rational deliberation cannot 
recover the narrative structure of the scene, though it might recall facts and evidence in 
the defense of a legitimacy claim. 
The work of theorists of participatory politics who champion the communicative 
model of action hinges for success on two fundamental notions:  that the loss of public 
space as a space for action is constitutive of modern world alienation, and that restoration 
of action to the modern typology will restore commonality and worldliness to our 
political being.  However, the participatory guarantee of a simulacrum of identity 
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constitution and effective agency is empty without the dramatic sphere of performance.  
It is crucial to recognize the temporal condition of world-alienation, which is not the 
mere loss of action, but the alienation of action from thought, and the loss of a bridge 
between past and future.  The difference between the coordinative function of 
communicative participation and the disclosive function of performance is the difference 
between teleological action as a brand new beginning and action that both sustains and is 
substantive of the world.  The ontological horizon of the space of appearance, the 
theatrum mundi, establishes the syncopated relationship between thinking and doing that 
grounds action in the world by realizing its meaning in the life of the mind.  “For at the 
center of politics lies concern for the world, not for man.”106 
If the modern loss of action were analogous to the loss of the capacity to begin, 
the communicative model of action would more than suffice as a recuperative project.  
There is a more fundamental loss at stake, however, which Arendt refers to explicitly and 
performatively – that is, the loss of the reciprocal and syncopated relationship between 
thinking and doing that founds the public realm as a place of endurance and continuation.  
In an age of unprecedented innovation at an ungraspable momentum, the need to recover 
the capacities to witness and remember, to give testament and judge, has grown terribly 
urgent. 
  
                                                          
106
 Arendt, the Promise of Politics, 106. 
 57 
 
REFERENCES CITED 
Arendt, Hannah. Between Past and Future. New York: Penguin Books, 1954. 
Arendt, Hannah. Essays in Understanding. New York: Schocken Books, 1994. 
Arendt, Hannah. Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy.  Chicago:  University of 
Chicago Press, 1982. 
Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. 
Second edition. 
Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind. San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1971. 
Arendt, Hannah. The Promise of Politics. New York: Schocken Books, 2005. 
Benhabib, Seyla.  “Hannah Arendt and the Redemptive Power of the Narrative.” In 
Hannah Arendt: Critical Essays, edited by Hinchman and Hinchman.  111-142. 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. 
Benhabib, Seyla. The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt. New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2000. 
Birmingham, Peg.  Hanna Arendt and Human Rights.  Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2006. 
Birmingham, Peg. “Hannah Arendt:  The Spectator’s Vision.” In the Judge and the 
Spectator, edited by Joke J. Hermsen and Dana R. Villa, 29-42. Leuven, Belgium: 
Peeters, 1999. 
D’Entrèves, Maurizio.  The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt.  London:  Routledge, 
1994. 
Habermas, Jürgen. “Hannah Arendt’s Communications Concept of Power” in Hannah 
Arendt: Critical Essays, edited by Hinchman and Hinchman, 211-230. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1994. 
Habermas, Jürgen.  The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society.  Boston: Beacon Press.  1984. 
Kateb, George. Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil. Totowa, New Jersey: 
Rowman & Allanheld, 1984. 
Kottman, Paul. A Politics of the Scene. Stanford University Press, 2008. 
Lara, Maria Pia.  “Reflective Judgment as World Disclosure.”  Philosophy and Social 
Criticism 34 (2008), pp. 83-100.  
O’Byrne, Anne E. Natality and Finitude. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2010. 
 58 
 
Taminiaux, Jacques.  “Time and the Inner Conflict of the Mind.”  In the Judge and the 
Spectator, edited by Joke J. Hermsen and Dana R. Villa: 43-58. Leuven, Belgium: 
Peeters, 1999. 
Villa, Dana. Politics, Philosophy, Terror.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. 
Zerilli, Linda.  “We Feel Our Freedom: Imagination and Judgment in the Thought of 
Hannah Arendt.”  Political Theory 33.2 (2005), pp. 158-188. 
 
